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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: WHERE IS THE WILL?

BY

COLONEL W. J. NATYNCZYK
Canadian Forces

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Colonel George Oliver Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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After a decade of challenges in peacekeeping operations, the United Nations (UN) is in need of greater support from its member nations. The inability of this international organization to stabilize several crises damaged its credibility in exercising one of its primary functions, reducing human suffering. The turning point for the UN came with the successful intervention of a coalition of willing nations, led by Australia, in stabilizing the East Timor crisis. Sanctioned by the Security Council, the operation proved the value of rapid deployment of well-trained and self-sufficient forces in demonstrating international resolve and reducing human suffering.

This research project investigates coalitions of the willing. The study considers the global, regional and national causes that compel nation states to contribute forces to coalitions; the characteristics of coalitions; the capacity of nations to provide intervention forces; and, finally the measures that the United Nations are undertaking to improve its rapid-reaction intervention capabilities.

The study will argue that coalitions, as organized by capable lead nations, are the preferred instruments for conflict intervention. In those crises when consent of those engaged in the conflict is questionable or in the absence of a lead nation, non-state actors such as the United Nations must have the capacity to react in a timely and effective manner.

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COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: WHERE IS THE WILL?

PAST FAILURE - FUTURE PROMISE

The past decade has been harsh on the credibility of the United Nations. Forced to react to numerous complex crises while sustaining many other missions, the international organization's inability to stop the suffering of civilians tarnished its once bright image. United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan remarked upon these missions, specifically in Rwanda, when he expressed, "even though there was a United Nations Force in the country at the time, it was neither mandated nor equipped for the kind of forceful action which would be needed to prevent or halt the genocide." Despite the presence of soldiers with the trademark blue berets, belligerents were able to continue their slaughter, leaving hundreds of thousands dead and millions injured and displaced. Additional UN failures in Srebrenica, Bosnia and in Sierra Leone exacerbated the damage wrought upon the credibility of the organization.

The 1990s were not without some modest success for the United Nations. For example, with the assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the UN was able to launch a successful operation into Kosovo and maintain stability in Macedonia. However, the flagship success story lay in the UN's swift and decisive action in East Timor. The intervention by coalition forces, operating under the banner of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) were instrumental in stopping the campaign of violence, looting and arson in East Timor. This mission heralded a new phase in the evolution of peacekeeping operations. Australia demonstrated profound leadership in forming a capable coalition that stabilized a tragic humanitarian crisis.²

The post-Cold war era has created ripe conditions for global instability with an unprecedented number of regional conflicts requiring military interventions by the United Nations, the NATO alliance, and regional organizations. As witnessed in several examples, the 189 member states of the United Nations were unable to contribute the right forces at the right time to effective address these crises, until the Australian-led intervention in East Timor. The Australian experience was held up as a model for successful intervention. Using the East Timor example, the UNSG argued for an enhanced operational capability to react to crisis citing the key lesson that, "the speedy deployment of UN peacekeepers was an absolute necessity if conflicts were to be contained. At present, it is as if when a fire breaks out we must first build a fire station in order to respond."³

The UNSG articulated his vision of the new era in international security and the role that nation states must play:

The world has changed in profound ways since the end of the Cold War, but...our conceptions of national interest is needed in the new century, which would induce states to find greater unity in the pursuit of common goals and values. In the context of many of the challenges facing humanity today, the collective interest is the national interest.⁴

Kofi Annan argued that the responsibility for international security rests with nations and enforced by those willing to act in coalition. He identified that, "...it is essential that the international community reach consensus...on ways of deciding what action is necessary, and when and by whom." 5

This research project investigates coalitions of the willing. The examination will consider the reasons that compel nations to provide forces; the characteristics of coalitions; the capacity of nations to provide forces; and, finally the measures that the United Nations is undertaking to improve its rapid-reaction capabilities. This study will argue that coalitions, as organized by capable lead nations, are the preferred instruments for conflict intervention. In crises where consent of those engaged in the conflict is questionable or in the absence of a lead nation, non-state actors such as the United Nations must have the capacity to react in a timely and effective manner.

PARTICIPATION IN COALITIONS

The decision to participate in an international security intervention is made at the national executive level. Often the deployment of national forces is the result of extensive analysis and debate. The expenditures of non-forecasted defence resources, the projection of a national force on another sovereign nation's soil and the increased risks to the security of military personnel are some of the reasons that governments seek broad domestic consensus for their decision to act. The potential for mission failure, personnel casualties and accidents pose significant political risk to the intervening nation. Therefore, governments must assess their national interests in a conflict and determine whether these interests are worth the inherent political and military risks of intervention.

An example of a government policy in this context was the U.S. President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which established the Administration's comprehensive policy for participating in multilateral peace operations within a UN context.⁶ The policy came into effect in May 1994 following the lessons learned from the multinational peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

The Administration assessed that the post-Cold War era would continue to be a dangerous period where conflicts will occur more often between societies within nations than

between nations themselves. Intra-state conflicts pose tremendous challenges for intervening nations in determining the best method of intervention to end conflict. Societal conflicts of this nature are often the result of political disorder and thus have no simple solution. The U.S. recognized that the outcomes are traditionally drawn-out, complex and resource-intensive for the intervening forces.⁷

Yet, the Presidential Directive concluded that well-planned and well-executed peacekeeping missions could be useful instruments of U.S. Foreign Policy. The aim of PDD 25 was to apply a more selective, yet effective, approach to U.S. peacekeeping responses by establishing principles aimed at improving the employment of U.S. armed services in multinational peacekeeping missions. Important to this study was that the policy directive established that the U.S. would participate in a UN mission under certain circumstances related to national interests, global security, mandate clarity, operational feasibility, mission costs and funding.⁸

In the past, the U.S. chose to intervene in various peacekeeping missions only when the confluence of national interests and values rendered a compelling case for intervention. Prior to PDD 25, the lack of U.S. support to intervene in a crises where the national interests were not compelling, such as in Rwanda, led to the lack of military contributions by other UN nations, resulting in mission failure. Following the promulgation of PDD 25, the U.S. signaled renewed interest in security operations. In September 1994, the U.S. military successfully led the United Nations' force representing 28 countries to restore stability in Haiti. Secretary of State Warren Christopher described the swift and decisive intervention as recognition of the U.S.'s responsibility to halt the violence in Haiti that represented, "a threat to regional security and international norms."

It is appropriate therefore, to focus on the reasons a sovereign nation chooses to participate or lead a coalition. The factors are both external and internal to the nation state and could be viewed from the global, regional and domestic tiers of factors and interests. The first part of this paper will assess these three dimensions.

GLOBAL ISSUES

This section reviews the global security climate in the post-Cold war era to establish the global trends meriting intervention by coalitions of willing nations. From the research of three well-known authors, the prognosis for future conflict is clear. The world is not more stable or peaceful following decades of détente. Peacekeeping forces will be required to stabilize many new complex crises in the future.

Following the disengagement by the world's two superpowers the current era is characterized by the lack of security interests outside of nation states; friction along ethnic lines; a rising number of failed states due to emerging nationalism; and pressure on the environment through population growth and resource consumption. Throughout the 1990s, the world community transitioned to overcome the bi-polar stalemate. The Cold War era represented a period of relative stability; the East-West confrontation led to predicable intervention in the event of regional instability. When countries stumbled into difficulty through political turmoil, economic hardship and ethnic tension, the superpowers invariably intervened. Their influence and resources persuaded the troubled states from siding with the competing superpower. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, superpower confrontation transformed to superpower cooperation, leaving no peer protagonists to stabilize failing states.

Yugoslavia is a case in point. Following World War II, with a depressed economy and weakened military, President Tito looked to the Soviet Union for assistance. It soon became clear however that the Soviets' obliging efforts to assist were in fact attempts to transform the military into a conventional fighting force modeled on the Red Army subject to Soviet control. Their objective was to assist Yugoslavia, but more to the point, to reap the agricultural and industrial benefits of the productive population. Tito played a skillful game in balancing the West against the Soviets to gain support from both. His country was of strategic importance in the West's defence of Italy and Austria in the event that the Soviets launched attacks through Hungary. With the end of the Cold war, Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance to both sides. When trouble appeared in 1990 and violence broke out in the summer of 1991, the conflict was relegated to the bottom of Western diplomats' priority lists since the security of Yugoslavia was no longer a vital interest for the West.

As the country spiraled into a tragedy of human suffering and destruction, the West assumed a minimalist approach. The European Community (EC) assumed the early lead in negotiating an end to the crisis. Unfortunately, the EC did not have the resolve to furnish the required military or diplomatic power to halt the violence. The U.S. was unwilling to intervene, believing the conflict to be a European problem. The United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) were finally deployed and empowered by incremental and broad UN mandates. The military forces required to implement these mandates and stem the tide of violence were not provided. The conflict was finally brought to an untidy close with the deployment of 60,000 NATO troops after four years of fighting, the deaths of thousands, the displacement of millions of refugees and cataclysmic destruction.

Yugoslavia's ethnic civil war serves as an example of author Samuel P. Huntington's thesis on the clash of civilizations. Huntington sees the transformation of world politics in the post-Cold War era along cultural and civilization lines. New actors are sub-groups of nation states with similar attributes such as language, religion and culture. According to Huntington, there are two worlds in conflict: a prosperous world of economic growth and global integration, and a world of increasing nationalism, ethnic conflict, instability and global chaos. Essentially, he holds that these two worlds are real and interrelated. Specifically, Huntington states that, "the forces of economic development and integration are also generating much of the chaos that exists in the world". 13

Huntington prescribes that the world's fault line has shifted from the Iron Curtain, where it remained for 45 years, to the line separating the Christian West on one side and the Orthodox (Christian) and Muslim East on the other. He assessed that violence between states and groups from different civilizations, for example Bosnia, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Kashmir, held potential for escalated violence as other states sharing the same civilization, render support to their ethnic brethren.¹⁴

Robert Kaplan, in his major thesis on "The Coming Anarchy", echoed Huntington's assessment that the violence in the world is caused not solely by poverty and economic stagnation, but also by global economic success and development. Kaplan assesses that traditional political boundaries are becoming increasingly irrelevant. Common bonds such as ethnicity, language, and religion between similar groups are growing in importance. The deterioration of traditional nation states, he contends, is sufficient to engulf the world in global crisis. In this vein, Kaplan observed that chaos in three relatively small countries such as Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, resulted in international instability and the expenditure of tremendous resources. He predicted even wider chaos when larger countries, such as India and China, with ethnic and economic disparities begin to fragment.

Jessica Tuchman Mathews builds on Kaplan's recommendation for increased attention to demographics and adds environmental conditions to the list of destabilizing factors in global security. She observed that the natural resources are being consumed at an alarming rate. Fifteen percent of the world's population is consuming 70 percent of globe's resources.¹⁷ The increase of three billion people over the last three decades has placed tremendous pressure on the planet. Owing to improvements in infant mortality rates and general nutrition over recent decades, there are more hungry people on the planet than ever before. Yet, given the projected rate of growth, the population of the world is expected to double by 2050.¹⁸

The indirect consequence of the population explosion, poverty and famine is that refugees have become a tool of foreign policy. Citing examples in Rwanda, Haiti and Kosovo, Matthews believes that global instability will result from the pressures of massive population shifts. This trend will force democracies to compromise their national values to permit the migration of refugees. Reinforcing Robert Kaplan's assessment, Matthews recommends that the international community must be proactive to address social development to remedy these humanitarian needs. She recognizes that global crises will continue to consume the already inadequate capabilities of traditional stabilization forces.¹⁹

REGIONAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY

Building upon these global factors, the need to ensure regional security provides a pervasive reason for nation states to provide forces to restore order and peace. Especially in the age of globalization, nations generally engage in security, cultural and economic relationships with other state actors in close proximity. Wherever regional instability occurs, it spreads quickly to neighboring nations hampering their economies and driving away foreign investment. Instability and economic hardship lead to the mass movement of civilians who flee violence and deprivation.

Australia's role in East Timor illustrates the importance of regional interests in the creation of coalitions. Of all the South East Pacific countries, Australia was the most engaged in addressing the conflict on the tiny island some 500 miles North of Darwin. Australia's interests were ignited by the Indonesian military's invasion of the former Portuguese colony in 1975. The UN Security Council issued resolutions between1976 to 1982 to encourage Indonesian forces to withdraw and to allow the East Timorese people the right of self- determination. Despite these efforts, the cause did not receive due attention or priority by the international community to have the desired effect. The Indonesian occupation was tolerated.²⁰ The period of the Indonesian occupation was a dark and bloody chapter in the history of the island. Between 1976 and 1980, estimates of death from military action, famine and disease ranged from 100,000 to 230,000 out of a population of 630,000. The violence reached a peak in 1991 when the Indonesian military opened fire on a funeral procession in the capital city of Dili. The Indonesian investigation estimated that 50 civilians were killed, 91 were wounded and another 90 were missing.²¹

International interest mounted following the massacre, most notably from Australia. With significant pressure by the UN and Australia, Indonesia finally agreed in January 1999 to accept a joint proposal with Portugal to allow the East Timorese to vote in referendum on whether to remain with Indonesia or separate. Indonesia accepted the responsibility to maintain the peace

throughout this period.²² On 30 August 1999, the islanders overwhelmingly rejected the union with Indonesia in a referendum monitored by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET).²³ Following the announcement of the ballot results, pro-Indonesian militias, with Indonesian military support, went on a violent rampage, committing arson, looting and killing pro-sovereignty supporters. While the death toll is uncertain, approximately 500,00 civilians were displaced, many of whom were forcibly deported to prison-like refugee camps in West Timor.²⁴

The degree of violence and destruction shocked the Security Council into action. On 7 September 1999, UNSG Kofi Annan issued a strong statement for Indonesia to restore security or face international intervention. The Australian government lobbied strongly for a United Nations sanctioned intervention force as a means of extricating Indonesia from its self-inflicted quagmire. After first rejecting the proposal, Indonesia accepted the need for a force. The UN Security Council subsequently authorized the creation of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), under Australian leadership. Its mandate was to restore peace and security, protect and support UNAMET in achieving its mission and within its abilities, facilitate humanitarian assistance.²⁵

Australia's prominence in the South Pacific and its strategic environment were key factors in its decision to lead the coalition according to its post-action assessment:

The Asia-Pacific is host to more disrupted states than any other region of the world. None of these states, or even their neighbours, has the capacity or the motivation to mount a conventional attack on Australia. However, continued instability in the region poses an ongoing threat to Australian interests. The situation in East Timor provides a precedent that cannot be ignored. Not only did Australia have the responsibility to offer its assistance to help resolve an intolerable situation as a good neighbor and significant regional power, but it was not in Australia's interests to have a breakdown in civil order on its doorstep. The same can be said for other regional powers that contributed forces to INTERFET.²⁶

Australia found that it alone had the regional interests, national will and capability to support the United Nations in this endeavor. Germane to this study was the realization that sovereign nations, such as Australia, "must be prepared to deal with threats to regional security that do not involve direct threats on their territorial integrity. These circumstances include disrupted states, displaced populations, and a range of peace and humanitarian operations."²⁷ East Timor's instability posed most of these threats upon Australia.

There was surprise in some quarters that the U.S. did not assume a larger role in the crisis, providing neither the lead-nation share of resources nor a significant ground force. U.S.

Deputy Secretary of Defence John Hamre in an informal address to Australian Parliamentarians confirmed the change in U.S. policy. Speaking in November 1999, he noted the supporting role played by the U.S. forces in INTERFET and explained that this was the result of certain weariness in leading peace operations following experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo. He indicated that the U.S. had to become "comfortable with playing a supporting role in operations where U.S. participation is clearly called for and where another nation with the will and ability to take the lead is available.²⁸ Simply put, the U.S. assessment was that Australia had strong emotional ties to the territory, it was better positioned to act than the U.S., and Australia had the full confidence of the U.S. as its regional ally.²⁹

Emphasizing the need for regional actors to assume greater leadership in addressing conflict within their areas of interest, this policy was formally articulated in the January 2001 National Security Policy:

The decision to employ military forces to support our humanitarian and other interests focuses on the unique capabilities the military can bring to bear rather than on its combat power...In all cases, the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be commensurate with the interests at stake...Our involvement will be more circumscribed when regional states or organizations are better positioned to act than we are. Even in these cases, however, the United States will be actively engaged with appropriate diplomatic, economic and military tools.³⁰

Given the distinct political systems and historical experiences in the East and South East Asia-Pacific regions, Australia assessed that its regional security could only be achieved through leadership and regional cooperation.³¹ Its political, diplomatic and military elements of power were responsible for creating the coalition of willing nations. Aided by the coincident meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting, Australian Prime Minister Howard used the occasion to garner support for intervention. The "in-principle" support he received from heads of state ultimately resulted in firm commitments from key regional powers of Thailand, Korea, Singapore and the Philippines among many others.³² This regional cooperation provided legitimacy and the start point of this operation. Clearly, Australia's experience provides an excellent example of regional security interests prompting a state to engage in coalition operations.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND VALUES

Arguably, the most pervasive reasons for a country to become engaged in a coalition effort are its own national interests and values. In this regard, the United States provides an ideal model. Its interests and values are clearly articulated its National Security Strategy. The

U.S.'s strategy is one of engagement with the goals of enhancing security at home and abroad while promoting prosperity, democracy and human rights. These goals are rooted by two guiding principles: protecting U.S. national interests and advancing U.S. values. National interests are organized in three categories, vital, important, and humanitarian.

Vital interests include the survival and security of the nation and its allies, the safety of U.S. citizens, protection against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the protection of the economy and critical infrastructure.³³ The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan following the terrorists' attacks in New York and in Washington illustrates action taken in the vital interests of the homeland. It was so important to the nation's interests that the al Queda network be brought to justice that the U.S. launched what was primarily a unilateral action. Although the United Nations Security Council endorsed the military action, the U.S. conducted the assault on the Taliban with minimal support from its allies.³⁴

Important interests address U.S. concerns abroad as they affect the nation and where there is significant economic and political stakes. This category also includes issues of significant environmental importance, and humanitarian interventions involving large numbers of refugees. In this category, the U.S. administration substantiated its actions in supporting the NATO intervention in Bosnia and its support to the Australian led efforts in restoring peace to East Timor.³⁵

Humanitarian interests relate to actions taken specifically in response to natural and manmade disasters, in halting gross violations of human rights, in support of emerging democracies, in demining and in associated activities. The U.S.'s humanitarian relief efforts redressing Hurricane Mitch's destruction in Central America and the devastating earthquake in Turkey in 1999 are recent examples. The U.S.'s firm resolve and determined actions in support of NATO against Serbia in Kosovo exemplifies action aimed at addressing gross violations of human rights.

The criticisms often voiced against nations that did not act or were slow to react to humanitarian crises reflect the school of idealism that often clashes with the school of "real politick". Indeed, the challenge in addressing humanitarian interests is a fundamental requirement to achieve balance between idealism and realism. There is significant friction between a world governed by righteousness and the realities of a world driven by the compromises of politics. Yet, the integration of the humanitarian imperative into a national strategy is assessed to bring geo-strategic advantage and increased effectiveness to a national strategy.³⁶

Parallel to the protection of U.S. national interests is the over-arching guidance provided by the expression of America's core values: political and economic freedom, respect for human rights and the rule of law. In addition to providing a focus for domestic policies and laws, these values provide the principles for international engagement, specifically with democratic liberties, international peace and stability.³⁷

When the nation's interests and values converge to create a compelling case for intervention, the U.S. administration will employ all elements of national power: political, economic, informational and military. When the nation is at risk, the populace expects the government to take whatever action is necessary to defend their security. When the nation's security is not at stake, yet its interests are challenged, the leadership must decide whether the nation's values are sufficiently violated to prompt action. ³⁸ This situation leads to uncertainty and presses national leadership to demonstrate resolve. Indeed, since World War II the global community has come to depend upon U.S. moral, financial and military leadership to act in these instances as a reflection of the national character and confirmation of its status as a superpower. ³⁹

To conclude this portion of the study, nations participate in coalitions for numerous reasons but generally stemming from their national interests and values. Their rationale may extend from their borders to include global and regional security action. If these interests and values converge with the right leadership, nations will participate in causes even when their national security is not at risk. In response to global and regional security needs, nations will participate in coalitions when they perceive their national interests in a collective context.

CAPABILITY TO PARTICIPATE

For a nation to assume a leading or meaningful role in a coalition operation, there must be more than political intent. Clearly, having sufficient national interest to act with military force in pursuit of humanitarian interests, regional stabilization efforts, or in reaction to global security crises is laudable. For a nation state to successfully participate in a coalition, it must have the legitimacy and capacity to meet the challenges of these roles. The nature of coalitions and the capacity of nations to participate in peacekeeping operations will be reviewed in this second section of the project.

U.S. joint doctrine defines coalitions in the following manner:

A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the long-term

interests of the members. Coalitions are formed by different nations with different objectives than long standing alliances. 40

By extension, the term "coalition of the willing" refers to multilateral cooperative arrangements between nations with the shared interests and the national will to act with military force for a specific purpose, action or event. Military coalitions are the means by which the armed forces of different countries collaborate to achieve common ends. Coalition formation and sustainment are the result of political interaction between nation states. In this vein Clausewitz states, "politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops - where its outlines already exist in their hidden rudimentary form, like the characteristics of living creatures in their embryos". ⁴¹

This sets the stage for coalition operations throughout the spectrum of conflict from peacekeeping to warfighting. In the current geo-strategic context, coalitions can be formed in two ways. First, they could be formed under the auspices of the United Nations or other regional organization to serve the interests of collective security. An example of military coalitions is the successful deployment of the United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea in November 2000. A coalition force was formed under the banner of the Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) representing an association of UN states that had made a commitment to contribute to UN Chapter VI peace support missions.⁴²

The second category includes military coalitions formed by a lead nation in response to a significant disruption of international order. Since the experiences in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the international community is accepting greater responsibility in restoring and enforcing peace in failing states. Ad hoc coalitions are formed on short notice, with an over-arching Security Council Resolution providing legitimacy. Especially when rapid reaction to a UN Chapter VII mission is necessary, or when the United Nations force generation process is unable to react promptly, associations of nations with common security interests have displayed the capability to contribute forces and restore stability. NATO's stabilization forces in both Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the INTERFET mission in East Timor are illustrative of this point.

Coalition operations have been the norm for almost every military operation throughout the 20th century. Yet, military forces tend to prepare for conflict as if they will be acting alone. Governments often neglect political, military and diplomatic preparation for coalition efforts until they are necessary.⁴⁴ Few countries besides the United States are able to mount and sustain military operations unilaterally. The nature of modern conflict demands that nation states exercise the legitimate right to engage in military operations for self-interest. It is only through the combined efforts of nation states cooperating in coalitions and sponsored within the

authority and mandate of international law, that militaries may legitimately engage in operations involving third parties.

LEGITIMACY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The central authority for legitimate international military action is the United Nations. The history the UN's ascension to this role is useful. Following the end of World War I, the goal of the victors was to replace the balance of power system and to restrict the unilateral use of force by nation states. The Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 was to provide the international legal and institutional system to achieve these ends. A significant portion of the system was the use of military forces for collective purposes in maintaining international security. A champion for this cause was U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who argued:

I am proposing, as it were, that nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people...that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power. 46

The doctrine of collective security in the League of Nations was born from the peace plans that were prevalent since the creation of the Westphalian system in the 17th century. The doctrine advocated the combined use of all states' forces to challenge the unlawful use of force and prevent cross-border attacks into sovereign states. In its purest form, the collective security arrangement provided for an automatic response by nations whereby their commitment to the collective would occur without further domestic debate. In reality, there was significant tension between the ideals of an effective and automatic collective security arrangement and the requirement for domestic control of military forces and public accountability. The inability to react due to this weakness led to the loss of credibility by the League of Nations following the invasions of Manchuria and Abyssinia. As

Building upon the lessons of the League of Nations, the United Nation's Charter went further with the intent of creating a collective security arrangement with greater attention paid to democratic accountability. The UN Charter requires member states to "refrain... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state". ⁴⁹ The Charter encouraged peaceful settlements of international disputes but also provided a system for collective action if negotiations were unsuccessful. The Security Council became the supreme authority in monitoring global crises and was empowered to initiate collective military action under the provisions established in Article 43 of Chapter VII in the Charter. The arrangements stipulated that member states would provide military forces, assistance, support facilities and rights of passage. The Security Council was to have a Military Committee

consisting of the chiefs of defence of the permanent members to advise the Council on military matters.⁵⁰

Over time, member states were found to be unwilling to contribute forces to the Security Council as the Charter had intended. The questions of international violations of peace, the scope of intervention and the provision of forces were left to the interpretation by individual member states. In response to the Cold War's first signs in the subversive elements in Greece and Turkey, the United Nations proved unable to react promptly and effectively. President Truman explained his intent to bypass the United Nations by taking unilateral action with these comments:

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this [Greek-Turkish] crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.⁵¹

Nevertheless, when military action is warranted, states and international organizations defend their intervention on the legitimacy provided in the UN Charter. In this regard, the United Nations is considered to be at the apex of the international political and legal structure. Precedents have been established; the standard requirement for military intervention is the UN's authorization. Thus far, the UN Security Council and General Assembly have approved 58 missions⁵²

The NATO alliance claims legitimacy under the provisions of Article 51 of its Charter that allows states, individually or collectively, to act in self-defense, "...until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Legitimacy is less certain when NATO and other collective organizations act outside their borders in operations that are not considered self-defense and when their actions have not received UN endorsement. The recent example of the humanitarian intervention by the NATO-led coalition in Kosovo provides a case in point. Expecting China and Russia would block a Security Council Resolution approving the use of military force to end the violence in Kosovo, the U.S. and United Kingdom gained NATO authorization instead, bypassing the UN system. The Kosovo situation set a new precedent in legitimizing military intervention. Kofi Annan clearly expressed the moral dilemma that the United Nations faced in this regard by his comments:

To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might say: leave Kosovo aside for the moment, and think about Rwanda. Imagine for one moment that, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had been a coalition of states ready and willing to act in defence of the Tutsi

population, but the Council had refused or delayed giving the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood idly by while the horror unfolded?

To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when states and groups of states can take military action outside the established mechanisms for enforcing international law, one might equally ask: Is there not a danger of such interventions undermining the imperfect yet resilient security system created after the second world war, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedences and in what circumstances?⁵⁴

The dilemma faced by the United Nations is daunting especially when considering humanitarian interests over the absolute sovereignty of individual states. The UN Security Council is empowered to authorize military action in times of crisis, subject to the consensus of its member states. However, the UN does not have assigned military forces and it is constrained by internal bureaucracies that are unable to respond to short notice requirements. Finally, especially after the UN's experience in Bosnia, the organization has not accepted peace enforcement tasks, preferring to endorse the efforts of collective security organizations such as NATO and regional leadership as witnessed with INTERFET.

Against this background, a review of the legal foundations of the INTERFET operation is warranted. Unable to generate its own forces on short notice to halt the violence and destruction in East Timor, the United Nations empowered Australia to form a coalition. Armed with a robust mandate, the coalition was to take all necessary measures to achieve its three tasks: restore peace and security in East Timor; protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks; and within force capabilities, facilitate humanitarian-assistance operations. The number of participating nations from the Asia-Pacific region as well as from Europe, the Middle East, North and South America further enhanced the legitimacy of the operation as indicated in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) after action review of the mission:

However, to be legitimate, intervention requires a broad-based, coherent and unified proportional response by a group of states – and the more heterogeneous the coalition, the more acceptable its actions will be. Without a central authority, international law relies on the observance of common norms and the willingness of states to enforce these normative rules of state behavior. The enforcement of public international mores requires legitimate states to commit appropriate forces to coalition efforts and to ensure that the conduct of operations are proportionate to the threat, effective, and abide by standing rules of armed conflict.⁵⁷

Australia was fortunate to have two uncontestable elements of legitimacy in its mission. First, Australia had a clear mandate from the UN Security Council. Second, it enjoyed the broad support of twenty-one nations that shared its regional security concerns.

LEAD NATION

At the core of a successful coalition operation is a capable lead nation. Unlike alliances which are underwritten by formal agreements that establish standards of doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, logistic support responsibilities and interoperability of command and control mechanisms, ad hoc coalitions have none of these features. A lead nation must assume the responsibilities to establish standards of operations. Participating nations assign operational control of their respective forces subordinate to a single partner which has agreed to lead in all or specific facets of the operation.⁵⁸ The lead nation generally provides the majority of the troops and underwrites shortages as necessary for mission accomplishment. In the East Timor example the ADF noted:

The complexity of assuming lead-nation status in a coalition had not been fully appreciated when Australia took on the task. Not only does the lead nation need to make a substantial personnel contribution and accept the risk that it will have to bear proportionate casualties, but it also takes on a substantial financial burden. ⁵⁹

It could be argued that a country with sufficient national interest to assume lead nation status in a coalition operation will have to dedicate all elements of national power to ensure mission success. The nation's credibility rests on the success of the mission. Australia fulfilled this remit, underwriting shortfalls in troop strength, logistics and funding in East Timor.

In contrast to the INTERFET experience, Canada attempted to spur the international community to join a multinational humanitarian effort in the African Great Lakes region of East Zaire in 1997. An executive decision was made that Canada would lead an assistance mission to the region despite a less than complete understanding of the complexities and magnitude of this venture within the Canadian Government, the military and its international partners. Historians noted:

It was forgotten that Canada was only leading the mission by default, that it lacked the logistical capability to support such a mission and that it had to call on American and Russian transport planes to back up its own Hercules. It was forgotten that the refusal of the parties to accept an international mission constituted a grave danger...The post mortem on the operation was painful...the Prime Minister had lacked first hand information from the field when he took the decision. Canada's inability to present a complete and solid plan of engagement to the already reluctant members of the coalition had made them even more skeptical; the government had placed the lives of its soldiers at risk by scoffing at what was obviously a political quagmire. The view was frequently expressed that Canada had narrowly escaped disaster...In this respect, the government may have yielded too hastily to pressures from humanitarian organizations. 60

Arguably, it is insufficient for nations to have the will to lead a coalition into an intervention mission. Nations need the capability provided through political will, military strength and economic leverage. All of these elements must be bound together with solid leadership.

DONOR FATIGUE

Traditional peacekeeping nations are challenged to strike the right balance in force structure to meet the needs of sustained operations. Western nations' military forces face significant mission fatigue in sustaining ongoing missions while accepting new international commitments with reduced military forces. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western nations have reduced the size and capabilities of their armed services. NATO nations, the traditional peacekeepers, reduced their defence expenditures significantly. European military spending declined about 17% between 1985 and 1998, while American resources were reduced by 28%. European residual spending was focused upon maintaining large standing forces as compared with developing force projection or expeditionary forces. Canada's military reductions were more severe. Real defence spending declined 40% since 1985 and the number of service members reduced from 84,000 to 59,000.⁶¹

Concurrently, the growth in requirements for expeditionary forces has ballooned. There were 19 missions deployed between 1945 and 1989 compared with 39 missions initiated in the post-Cold War era between 1990 and 1999.⁶²

To illustrate the fatigue factor, an examination of NATO's forces in Bosnia and Kosovo is warranted. Many traditional peacekeeping nations have contributed to the stabilization forces in the Balkans on a continuous basis since 1991. With a commitment of tens of thousands of service personnel for over a decade, NATO and its member nations have been fully engaged. This is especially true considering that some countries like Canada model their forces to retain at least four personnel outside of operations for every individual deployed on operations. This approach allows for rest, career courses, operational training, and preparation for the next mission. Following the Canadian model, NATO's deployment of approximately 50,000 soldiers in the Balkans requires 250,000 troops to sustain the operation. Maintaining this high level of commitment has reduced the flexibility of NATO's member states to react to contingency missions. ⁶³

Despite donor fatigue and the ongoing Balkan commitments, several NATO countries committed troops to the international security forces in Afghanistan in support of the campaign against terrorism. The United Kingdom assumed the lead nation role with sizable contingents provided by France, Germany and others. This development illustrates the significant point that

despite high operational tempo and donor fatigue, nations will find the means to contribute forces when overarching national interests compel participation in coalition operations.

RAPID REACTION AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The quandary for the United Nations pervades when nation states lack the interest or the capacity to contribute military forces to stabilize an unfolding crisis. To mitigate this problem, several initiatives were undertaken. First, several nations have collaborated to create a rapid reaction brigade capability. Secondly, the UN has become more reliant on regional organizations such as NATO to undertake peace support operations. Finally, multinational peacekeeping units have been formed to permit national participation in coalition operations.

The UN's intervention into Ethiopia and Eritrea in December 2000 is cause for optimism for a rapid reaction capability. These two African countries had achieved a fragile armistice after many years of fighting. They requested United Nations support to supervise the disengagement and broker border disputes. While UN member nations did not offer forces to meet this urgent requirement, the services of the Standing High Readiness Brigade Group (SHIRBRIG) were offered.

The SHIRBRIG concept, born from the lessons of Rwanda, addresses the need for swift deployments of capable forces in response to an unfolding crisis.⁶⁴ The Canadian Government study recommending the SHIRBRIG concept stated, *

The critical lesson of the Rwandan experience is that modest but timely measures can make the difference between a situation which is stable or contained and one which spirals out of control...Several principles are identified in the Report as crucial to creating a UN rapid reaction capability. The principle of reliability emphasizes decreasing response time while increasing effectiveness in parallel. The principle of quality aims at doing the job well rather than mounting a large and unwieldy multinational force. A related principle is that of effectiveness. A hasty response, poorly executed could be worse medicine than not reacting at all.⁶⁵

To meet this requirement, SHIRBRIG receives support of 14 countries that are willing to contribute forces to a peacekeeping operation. Participation under the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) is conditional upon each government's approval and is limited to a deployment period of less than six months. SHIRBRIG's mission is to respond to UN Chapter VI operations. Its tasks are to open the theatre, establish the peacekeeping operation, transfer responsibilities to a relieving force and finally, to withdraw in a seamless manner. Even with its short tour limitation, restriction to Chapter VI missions and small number of contributors, SHIRBRIG is the first step towards creating a reliable rapid force capability.

When nations are reluctant to commit their forces, the recent trend is that the United Nations will turn to regional organizations and request their intervention. SHIRBRIG and NATO are among several organizations that have provided peacekeeping services to the United Nations. Australia recruited its primary coalition partners for INTERFET from the membership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). African regional associations that have operated under UN auspices are the Economic Community of Western African States in Sierra Leone and the Organization of African States in Rwanda among many others. 66

Multinational units and formations are becoming more commonplace in peacekeeping operations. When nations wish to participate, but have critical shortfalls, bilateral and multinational cooperation provides the means. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, both the Netherlands and Canada were interested in participating in the mission, especially to fulfill their SHIRBRIG commitments. Due to the taxing consequences of the Balkan operations, they were unable to provide independent peacekeeping contingents. However, the nations agreed to a combined contingent that formed the core of SHIRBRIG organization. Each nation provided combat forces and integrated combat support and service support functions.⁶⁷

The concept of the UN rapid reaction capability, the delegation of peace support operations to regional organizations and multinational units are recent developments that have served to bolster the capability of the United Nations. All of these measures portend flexibility and unity of effort in providing the UN the forces it requires.

REPORT OF THE BRAHIMI PANEL

At the core of the peacekeeping conundrum of needs versus capacity is the consistent theme that the United Nations must become more effective in orchestrating its peacekeeping operations. In response to these criticisms, the UN Secretary General commissioned a comprehensive review that has become known as the Brahimi Report. Led by the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi, the report was completed by an international panel consisting of members drawn with a range of experience in peacekeeping, development and humanitarian assistance. The Panel's recommendations addressed peacekeeping factors of politics and strategy, but with a focus on operations and organization.

Renewing the original concept of the United Nations, the overarching conclusion of the report was the need for member states to provide clear, strong and continued support to the Secretary General. The report argued for more than good intentions without substance. It identified the need for nations to provide strong political and financial support as well as rapidly

deployed, robust and credible military forces that could create the secure and stable conditions in which to build peace in troubled regions.⁶⁸

The recommendations were in five categories: to enhance strategic direction, to ensure the rapid deployment of well-trained forces, to improve operational planning and administrative support, and to accelerate the use of modern information technology. The report called for realistic peacekeeping mandates and cautioned against the mission creep caused by expanding mandates without the provision of additional forces and resources. Instead, the report called for "clear, credible and achievable mandates" that would remain in draft form until member states made firm commitments of forces and mission-enabling resources. ⁶⁹ In this manner, UN mandates will be inextricably linked to the support provided by its member states. The report urged a proactive approach in conflict prevention through pre-emptive diplomatic intervention. It encouraged delegating responsibilities to field commanders and senior staff to accelerate decision-making. The Panel also asked that countries identify trained senior commanders and staff who could be deployed swiftly to new operations.

The Brahimi Panel report has drawn attention to many peacekeeping shortcomings in an effective and constructive manner. The responsibility has been assigned to the Deputy Secretary-General to implement the UN's rehabilitation plan. But the measures will require the all-important support from the member states to achieve the needed success. The strength of the organization is truly the sum of all its parts.

CONCLUSION

Member states of the United Nations have made the commitment to uphold the essence of the Charter – to maintain global peace and to reduce human suffering. However, since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has not been entirely successful in its interventions. The organization has been inundated by crises that have unfolded in all corners of the globe. Despite its best efforts to meet the challenges, failures in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Sierra Leone have highlighted the UN's systemic shortcomings and have resulted in millions dead, injured and displaced.

Global security and humanitarian crises are predicted to continue at the same level if not grow in number. Divisions along ethic, religious and tribal lines will destabilize many corners of the world and are expected to expand further, from small nations to larger powers. As borders fade in importance, the deterioration of smaller nation-states will create regional instability. Lack of economic development, uncontrolled population growth, global warming and consumption of natural resources have created unprecedented levels of world poverty and hunger. The

migration of mass populations will exacerbate the plight of neighboring states. As if maintaining the current tempo of operations is not difficult enough, new global crises will further challenge the capacity of traditional peacekeeping forces. The United Nations will not be able avoid the increasing requirement for stabilization forces in the future.

To address these needs, regional security arrangements will grow in importance. Based upon Australia's role in East Timor and the precedent-setting decision by the U.S. to assume a supporting role in INTERFET, regional security efforts may be led more often by regional powers with the support of like-minded nations. Participation by other nations and endorsements by UN mandates will provide the necessary legitimacy for a successful mission.

Where global humanitarian crises, regional instability, and domestic interests make compelling cases for action, there is potential for the formation of coalitions of willing nations. To ignite the national will, leaders have a responsibility to link global and regional conflicts to their domestic interests and values. However, domestic consensus alone is an insufficient basis for a country to lead or participate in a successful coalition. Peacekeeping operations need to be legitimately sanctioned, a role that rests primarily with the United Nations. To be successful in intervention, nations will need to commit sufficient elements of national power. Even when nations lack the individual resolve or military capacity to intervene on their own, collective associations such as SHIRBRIG, regional security organizations such as NATO and the formation of multinational units all provide scope for participation through unity of effort. Innovative collaborative means permit burden sharing for sustained operations. Multinational units and formations can be successful under the right security conditions and between likeminded nations. The message being that if there is a will to participate then nations have many different ways to participate.

Despite the trend towards regional security organizations, the responsibility for global peace and security rests with the international community of nations, organized and directed through the United Nations. The Brahimi Panel has carefully reviewed shortcomings in the UN's structure and has established the measures necessary to resolve them in prompt fashion. Practical measures such as pre-emptive diplomatic intervention, divesting authority to field commanders and realistic, fully resourced mandates will go a long way to improve the status quo. The commitment of nations to provide high readiness forces and trained senior staff will be necessary to improve the UN's capability to react to crises. In the absence of a lead nation or regional organizations to respond to an unfolding humanitarian crisis, the UN must have the ability to react with dedicated, capable forces. These important measures will be all for naught,

without the genuine support of nations that have the will to commit their forces for the sake of peace.

President George W. Bush's address to UN General Assembly following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, outlining the coalition campaign against terror, reinforced the principal theme of this study project. The world community must address future global crises with leadership and action:

This struggle is a defining moment for the United Nations, itself. And the world needs its principled leadership...The United Nations depends, above all, on its moral authority -- and that authority must be preserved. The steps I described will not be easy. For all nations, they will require effort. For some nations, they will require great courage. Yet, the cost of inaction is far greater.⁷⁰

Word Count: 8,664.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Kofi Annan, "Kofi Annan Emphasizes Commitment to Enable UN Never Again to Fail in Protecting Civilian Population from Genocide or Mass Slaughter," 16 December 1999; available from http://srch1.un.org/plwebcgi/fastweb?state_id=1012151782&view=unsearch&numhits found=1&query=sg%2Fsm%2F7263%20afr%2F196%2016%20december%201999&&docid=21 56&docdb=pr1999&dbname=web&sorting=BYRELEVANCE&operator=adj&TemplateName=pre doc.tmpl&setCookie=1>; Internet; accessed 27 October 2001.
- ² Alan Ryan, <u>Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks Australian Defence Force</u>
 <u>Participation in the International Force East Timor</u>, Study Paper 304 (Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000), 15.
- ³ UN News Service, "On Thai Visit Kofi Annan Urges Creation of UN Rapid Response Capacity,"11 February 2000; available from http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/page2; Internet; accessed, 25 October 2001.
 - ⁴ Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," <u>The Economist</u>, (18 September 1999): 49-50.
 - ⁵ Ibid., 49.
- ⁶ Tony Lake and Wesley Clark, "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 15)," 5 May 1994; available from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25_brief.htm; Internet; accessed 13 September 2001.
 - ⁷ Ibid., 1.
 - ⁸ Lake and Clark, 3-6.
 - ⁹ Ibid., 5.
- ¹⁰ Warren Christopher, "Address to Security Council: Restoring Democracy to Haiti," 3 October 1994; available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?Did=000000005303053 &Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=49&Sid=2&RQT=309>; Internet; accessed 5 March 2002.
- ¹¹ James Gow, <u>Triumph of the Lack of Will International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 20-21.
 - ¹² Ibid., 26.
- ¹³Samuel P. Huntington, et al., <u>Sources of Conflict Highlights from the Managing Chaos Conference</u> (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 4, 1995), 5-6. Note that this document is a compilation of presentations by Samuel P. Huntington, Robert Kaplan and Barbara Tuchman Mathews on their major theses describing the sources of future global conflict.
 - ¹⁴lbid., 6.
 - ¹⁵ Ibid., 7.

- 16 Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 10.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid.
- ²⁰ Adam Schwarz, <u>A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s</u> (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), 206.
 - ²¹ Ibid., 211-217.
- ²² United Nations Security Council, "Agreement between the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal." 5 May 1999; available from http://www0.un.org/news/Press/docs/1999/19990507.sc6672.htm; Internet; accessed 1 November 2001.
- ²³ United Nations, "East Timor-UNTAET Background," available from http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm; Internet; accessed 4 December 2001.
- ²⁴ Alan Ryan, <u>From Desert Storm to East Timor, Australia, Asia Pacific and the New Age Coalition Operations</u>, Study Paper 302 (Duntroon: Land Warfare Study Centre, 2000), 13-15.
 - ²⁵ Ibid., 15.
 - ²⁶ Ryan, Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks, 31-32.
 - ²⁷ Ibid.
 - ²⁸ Ibid., 21-24
 - ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a Global Age</u> (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000), 19.
- ³¹ Paul M. Evans, "The Prospects for Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia/Pacific Region," in Desmond Ball, <u>The Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region</u>, Frank Cass, London, 1996, 203, quoted in Alan Ryan, <u>From Desert Storm to East Timor, Australia, Asia Pacific, and the New Age Coalition Operations</u> (Duntroon: Land Warfare Study Centre, 2000), 22-23.
 - ³² Ryan, <u>Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks</u>, 39-40.
 - ³³ Clinton, 1-4.
- ³⁴ Charles Krauthammer, "Unilateral? Yes Indeed," <u>The Washington Post</u> 13 December 2001; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41292-2001Dec13.html; Internet; accessed 15 December 2001.

- 35 Clinton, 4.
- ³⁶ Andrew Natsios, <u>US Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse</u> The Washington Papers/170, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Westport Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), 20-22.
 - ³⁷ Clinton, 4-5.
 - ³⁸ Ibid., 5.
 - ³⁹ Natsios, 24.
- ⁴⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff. <u>Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations</u>, 5 April 2000, Chapter 1, paragraph 1, quoted in U.S. Army War College, Course 4 Selected Readings, AY 02, <u>Implementing National Military Strategy</u>, (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 19 November 2001), 15.1.
- ⁴¹ Carl von Clausewitz, <u>On War</u>, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: University Press, 1989), 149.
- ⁴² Chapter VI of the United Nations' Charter specifies peaceful means to settle international disputes. In face of a threat to peace, Chapter VII of the Charter specifies that the Security Council may make recommendations or decide on measures to maintain or restore peace and stability.
 - 43 Ibid.
 - ⁴⁴ Ryan, From Desert Storm to East Timor, 4-5.
 - ⁴⁵ Henry Kissinger, <u>Diplomacy</u> (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), 225-227.
- ⁴⁶ Woodrow Wilson, <u>The Papers of Woodrow Wilson</u> (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1966), vol 40, 539.
- ⁴⁷ Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson, "Using Military Forces under International Auspices and Democratic Accountability," <u>International Relations of the South Pacific</u>, Volume 1, Oxford University Press and the Japan Association of International Relations, 2001, 26-27.
 - ⁴⁸ Ibid., 28.
- ⁴⁹ Secretary General of the United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," (New York: 1945) Article 2(4), quoted in U.S. Army War College, <u>Course 2 Selected Readings</u>, (Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, 30 July 2001), 89.
 - ⁵⁰ Ku and Jacobson, 9. See note 8 on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
- ⁵¹ "The Origins of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization-Isolationism, the UN Charter, and Post-War US Foreign Policy," quoted in U.S. Army War College, <u>Course 2: War, National Security Policy and Strategy</u>", (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 30 July 2001), 391.

- ⁵²Ku and Jacobson, 19.
- ⁵³ Secretary General of the United Nations, 100.
- ⁵⁴ Kofi Annan, 44-45.
- ⁵⁵ Ryan, Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks, 28-29.
- ⁵⁶ United Nations, "UN Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999) on the Situation in East Timor," 15 September 1999, Article 3; available from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1264.htm; Internet; accessed 15 December 2001.
 - ⁵⁷ Ryan, From Desert Storm to East Timor, 7.
- ⁵⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>, 10 September 2001, II-8. Operational control is defined as, "the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission."
 - ⁵⁹ Rvan, Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks, 45.
- ⁶⁰ Albert Legault, <u>Canada and Peacekeeping: Three Major Debates</u> (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999), 91-93.
- ⁶¹ Brian Finlay and Michael O'Hanlon, "NATO's Underachieving Middle Powers: from Burdenshedding to Burdensharing," <u>International Peacekeeping</u>, 7 (Winter 2000): 145-146.
 - ⁶² Ku and Jacobson, 15.
- ⁶³ Author served in National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, Canada as the Director of Joint Operations. This passage recounts the comments of then Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), General Sir Rupert Smith (UK) at NATO's Force Generation Conference for the Kosovo campaign on 26 July 1999.
- ⁶⁴ Gerald Hatzenbichler, "Civil-Military Cooperation in UN Peace Operations," <u>International</u> Peacekeeping 8 (Spring 2001): 118.
- ⁶⁵ Canada, <u>Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations</u> (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, September 1995), iv.
- ⁶⁶ Adelman Suhrke, <u>The Path of a Genocide</u> (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 196-197.
- ⁶⁷ The author was the Canadian Forces J3 Operations and participated in the planning of Multinational Division South West in Banja Luka, Bosnia Herzegovina and the deployment of the Dutch/Canadian battle group in Ethiopia-Eritrea. The bilateral working relationships at both the intergovernmental and military command levels contributed to the mutual trust and cooperation of these two combined peacekeeping operations.

⁶⁸ Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "Comprehensive Review of the whole question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects," letters from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, New York, 21 August 2000, viii.

⁶⁹ David Lightburn, "Lessons Learned," <u>NATO Review</u> (Summer 2001): 13.

⁷⁰ George W. Bush, "President Bush's UN General Assembly Speech," 10 November 2001; available from http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01111001.htm; Internet; accessed 27 January 2001.

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